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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD RICHARDS and ANNETTE 
RICHARDS, GEORGE Q. NIELSEN 
and SHERRY NIELSEN, RONALD 
HARRINGTON and MARY HARRINGTON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
PINES RANCH, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 14460 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND TO THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH: 
Comes now petitioner, Pines Ranch, Inc., a Utah corpo-
ration, and hereby respectfully requests a rehearing in the above 
entitled cause and that the decision and opinion of this Honorable 
Court filed herein on the 6th day of January, 1977, be reversed 
for the reason that the Supreme Court has erred in the following 
particulars: 
POINT I: THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN STATING IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF 
THE OPINION, "THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE PLAINTIFFS 
AND THEIR PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST HAD CROSSED THE LAND 
NOW OWNED BY THE DEFENDANT FOR APPROXIMATELY 40 YEARS." 
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POINT II: THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN STATING IN THE OPINION 
THAT REGULAR USE WAS NOT NECESSARY TO THE ESTABLISHMENT 
OF A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT AND THAT "ALL THAT IS REQUIRED 
IS THAT THE USE BE AS OFTEN AS IS REQUIRED BY THE OWNER 
OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE." 
POINT III: THE COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT DEFENDANT WAS UNABLE 
TO SHOW THAT THE USE OVER THE YEARS PRIOR TO RECENT TIMES 
, WAS BY PERMISSION OF THE THEN OWNERS. 
POINT IV: THE DECISION OF THE COURT REVERSING THIS CASE IS, 
•IN ANY EVENT, AMBIGUOUS. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this action the plaintiffs seek a declaratory 
judgment that they have a prescriptive easement to use an 
alleged "road" across the defendant's property, and they fur-
ther seek a restraining order preventing defendant from inter-
fering with such use. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried before the Honorable Stewart M. 
Hanson, Sr., without a jury. At the conclusion of plaintiffs' 
evidence, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint, and 
the Court took the motion under advisement. At the conclusion 
of the trial, the Court granted the aforesaid motion and judg-
ment was entered dismissing plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice. 
(R-36 & 37.) 
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court filed an opinion in this matter on 
January 6, 1917. Therein, the Supreme Court directed that "The 
judgment rendered should be and is hereby reversed. Costs are 
awarded to the plaintiffs." The opinion was written by Justice 
Ellett (now Chief Justice) and concurred in by F. Henri Henriod, 
Chief Justice; J. Allen Crockett, Justice; and D. Frank Wilkins, 
Justice. Justice Maughan filed a dissenting opinion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Petitioner herein seeks a decision on rehearing affirming 
the decision of the lower court, or that failing, for clarification 
of the majority opinion filed in this action. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN STATING IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF 
THE OPINION, "THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE PLAINTIFFS 
AND THEIR PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST HAD CROSSED THE LAND 
NOW OWNED BY THE DEFENDANT FOR APPROXIMATELY FORTY YEARS." 
In concluding that the evidence established that the 
plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest had crossed the 
land now owned by the defendant for approximately forty years, 
we respectfully submit that the Supreme Court has apparently 
relied upon the affidavit of Ethel Gibbons, which was admitted 
over objection of defendant at page 64 of the transcript. The 
said affidavit is clearly hearsay, and defendants were never 
permitted any opportunity to cross-examine Mrs. Gibbons. The 
affidavit does not fit within any of the exceptions to the 
Hearsay Rule as found in Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
the nearest exception being that found in Rule 63(4), which 
provides for the admission of certain hearsay statements where 
a declarant is unavailable as a witness, if the court finds 
that the declaration "was made by the declarant at a time when 
the matter had been recently perceived by him and while his 
recollection was clear, and was made in good faith prior to the 
commencement of the action;". In this instance, we respectfully 
submit that there was no showing that the witness was unavail-
able as a witness, there being no testimony whatsoever on that 
point; there was no testimony that the recollection of the 
_ 4_ 
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declarant was clear, and the affidavit bearing the date of July 5, 
1974, does not meet the qualification that it be a matter "recently 
perceived" by the declarant inasmuch as it deals with matters alleg-
edly occurring many, many years prior to 1974. Furthermore, the 
said affidavit was made almost six months after the commencement of 
this action, and thus fails to meet the final requirement of Rule 
63(4). To consider this affidavit as the basis for the decision of 
the Court constitutes a taking of defendant's property without due 
process of law and denies to defendant equal protection of the law 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States and in violation of Article I, Section 7; Article 
I, Section 2; Article I, Section 24; Article IV, Section 1 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
It should further be observed that by the undisputed evi-
dence, the activities of the plaintiffs themselves on the property 
commenced in 1961. The only evidence of use prior to 1961 was that 
of the aforesaid Ethel Gibbons and of one Robert C. Walsh. Mr. Walsh 
was not a predecessor in title of the plaintiffs. He testified that 
he went on the property from 19 36 to 1952 once each year to get 
Christmas trees. Thus, even if his testimony were considered per-
suasive and compelling, it would establish at most a right to 
obtain a Christmas tree once a year and would not, indeed, estab-
lish the other activities as referred to in the second paragraph 
of the Court's opinion, which were, in addition to the taking of 
Christmas trees, the grazing of sheep, cutting timber, camping, 
-5-
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holding picnics, horseback riding, etc- It should further be | 
noted that there is a gap from 1952 (the last year Mr. Walsh ! 
testified that he got a Christmas tree - T-54) to 19 61 when ] 
plaintiff Nielsen testified he went on the property with the per-
son from whom he purchased it, (T-10.) Even assuming that a 
prescriptive easement can only be lost by a prohibition of use 
for twenty years, as the opinion of the Supreme Court appears to 
indicate, that is nevertheless not the issue presented by these 
circumstances. That rule only applies once the prescriptive ease-
ment has been acquired. If the abandonment or non-use or inter-
ruption of use occurs prior to the establishment of the prescriptive 
easement, there is no requirement that it be abandoned for "a like 
period". We respectfully submit that a nine-year interruption is 
more than adequate to constitute an interruption in the activities 
claimed for acquiring a prescriptive easement. Even accepting that 
a prescriptive easement can be acquired without some use "each year", 
which we assume may be the thrust of the citation of the Supreme 
Court to 1 Thompson on Real Property, Specific Easement, Section 
464, page 575 (1924) , nonetheless we submit that that citation is 
a long ways from indicating that nine years of non-use is not fatal 
to the acquisition of a prescriptive easement. 
-6-
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POINT II: THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN STATING IN THE OPINION 
THAT REGULAR USE WAS NOT NECESSARY TO THE ESTABLISHMENT 
OF A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT AND THAT "ALL THAT IS REQUIRED 
IS THAT THE USE BE AS OFTEN AS IS REQUIRED BY THE OWNER 
OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE." 
We do not think the trial court intended, by the use of 
the word "regular", to indicate that the use asserted as a basis 
for prescriptive easement must occur at specified timed intervals 
or with any particular rhythm, nor do we contend that that is a 
requirement. We believe the trial court was using the word "regu-
lar" as essentially synonymous with "continuous". We respectfully 
submit that the word is commonly used this way. For example, a 
"regular customer" is one who frequents a given establishment 
continuously. We, therefore, feel that the use of the word "regu-
lar" should not be fatal to the trial court's finding. Furthermore, 
we respectfully submit that the statement that "all that is required 
is that the use be as often as is required by the owner of the domi-
nant estate" does not state the law and, indeed, would constitute a 
very unworkable principle of law. If taken at face value, that state-
ment found in the opinion of the Supreme Court, would permit prac-
tically any use, however infrequent, to constitute a basis for a 
prescriptive easement. A party could establish a prescriptive ease-
ment across a given tract by one solitary use over a span of twenty 
years by testifying that he only "needed"to use it that one time. 
We respectfully refer the Court again to the citation set out at 
palge i22 Q>& Respondent's brief, i:d-wit, 25 Am Jur 2d, Easements;' 
S&Gtior$ 56,t where it states thalt & prescriptive easement cannot be 
acquired by "occasional and sporadic acts for temporary purposes." 
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POINT III: THE COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT DEFENDANT WAS UNABLE 
TO SHOW THAT THE USE OVER THE YEARS PRIOR TO RECENT TIMES 
WAS BY PERMISSION OF THE THEN OWNERS. 
This matter was dealt with in Point II of Respondent's 
brief, and although we believe that a fair reading of that Point 
(which sets out seven separate illustrations of permissive use) 
demonstrates permissive use, we wish at this time to particularly 
• '• . ' • • • ' , . ' . » • ' . • • • 
emphasize the following: 
Defendant's witness, Rogerson, testified that prior to 
the 1960's, no one entered the property without permission. If 
persons were found on the premises without permission, they were 
"kicked off". (T-113.) And, of course, since the mid-60's, no 
twenty-year period has yet elapsed. Even if this case is deemed 
an equity case, giving the Supreme Court the right to disregard 
the findings of the trial judge, we submit that the long estab-
lished policy of the Supreme Court is to the effect that that 
should rarely and sparingly be done. In the dissenting opinion 
in this case, Justice Maughan quoted from Del Porto vs. Nicolo, 
27 Utah 2d 286, 495 Pac 2d 811 (1972) as follows: 
11
. . . Due the the advantage position of the trial 
court, in close proximity to the parties and the wit-
nesses, there is indulged a presumtion of correctness 
of his findings and judgment, with the burden upon the 
appellant to show they were in errror; and where the 
evidence is in conflict, we do not upset his findings merely 
because we may have reviewed the matter differently, but 
do so only if evidence clearly preponderates against them." 
We respectfully submit that there is nothing that appears 
in the record that would serve as a basis for disregarding the 
testimony of Rogerson as being untrustworthy or inaacurate. Indeed, 
-8-
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other than plaintiffs1 witness, Walsh, Roger son is the only witness 
called by either side having any knowledge of events prior to 
plaintiffs1 coming on the scene. His evidence, therefore, instead 
of being disregarded, ought, it would seem, to be given consider-
able weight rather than to be disregarded in favor of the hearsay 
statements contained in the affidavit of Mrs. Ethel Gibbons, which, 
as we have stated above, appears to us to be the only evidence that 
could be deemed contradictary to that of Mr. Rogerson. The testi-
mony of Walsh, we respectfully submit, is not necessarily contra-
dictory to that of Rogerson inasmuch as one trip per year to the 
premises in the wintertime is an activity which is not likely to 
be discovered, at least for a considerable period of time, other 
than purely upon the occasion of a chance meeting. We, therefore, 
submit that the testimony of Rogerson should not be disregarded 
and, if believed, it would establish that any prior use was indeed 
permissive. It would certainly further constitute an interruption 
in any claim to continuous, adverse use so as to prevent the same 
from accruing to the benefit of the plaintiffs or their successors. 
~9-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT IV: THE DECISION OF THE COURT REVERSING THIS CASE IS, 
IN ANY EVENT, AMBIGUOUS. 
In this case, assuming that the Supreme Court refuses 
to reverse its ruling, the decision of the Supreme Court is as 
follows: 
"The judgment rendered should be and is hereby reversed." 
The judgment of the court was that the Complaint of the plaintiff 
be dismissed with prejudice. We take it then at this point that 
there is no judgment of the lower court dismissing plaintiff's 
Complaint with prejudice, or otherwise, and indeed, there is no 
judgment of the lower court at all. Under principles announced 
by this Court in the case of Cobb vs. Snow, 14 Utah 2d 170, 380 Pac 
2d 457 (1963), the case is to be deemed before the District Court 
as though no judgment had been entered, leaving the District Court 
free at that point to undertake such proceedings as are just and 
proper and as are not inconsistent with the opinion of the Supreme 
Court in this matter. We further take it that that might include 
taking further evidence, if necessary, and in any event to resolve 
what we take to be questions propounded by this Court in the third 
to last paragraph of the main opinion, to-wit: (1) That the lower 
court determine whether or not the plaintiffs crossed the land now 
owned by the defendant by a way which can be located on the ground, 
and if that is answered in the affirmative by the trial court for 
determination of the location of that right-of-way sufficient to 
enable the same to be described in the final decree in this matter. 
-10-
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In that connection we cite the Court the case of Bart's Body 
Shop, Inc., vs. Hageman, 536 Pac 2d 1150, a 1975 Colorado case, 
in which the court stated that an accurate legal description 
should be ascertained before a proper decree could be entered. 
In the instant case, such a definite finding was not required by 
the trial court because of the trial court's disposition of the 
case in favor of the defendant. (2) That the trial court deter-
mine whether the plaintiffs did, in fact, cross the land of the 
defendant whenever they desired and as a right, and we take it 
further that the trial court will have to determine the questions 
raised in the dissenting opinion of Justice Maughan, to-wit, which 
one of the eight subdivided tracts of five acres each is contigu-
ous with the aforesaid right-of-way when finally determined as to 
location by the trial judge, and a determination of the nature of 
the use established in the past as it relates to future use. This 
Court, having indicated in the main opinion that, "While the use 
made, could limit the future use, it does not entirely prevent a 
prescriptive use to cross the defendant1 s land." It appears that such 
determinations are in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits inas-
much as the plaintiffs have subdivided the forty acres for the 
purpose of establishing cabin sites, and that use has.never been 
established by plaintiffs or any of their predecessors under any 
view of this case. 
-11-
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We respectfully submit that the foregoing conclusions 
on the part of respondents are fairly taken and will be urged in 
the lower court, and if the same are in any way not in accord 
with the opinion of this Court, we would respectfully request 
the assistance of the Court in clarifying these matters prior 
to further proceedings in the lower court. 
It should also be noted that Judge Stewart M. Hanson, 
Sr. , has retired since the trial on this case, which indicates 
that further clarification may be not only helpful, but necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the decision 
of the trial court was correct and that the Complaint of the 
plaintiffs was properly dismissed. We feel that the Supreme 
Court, in reaching its decision, of necessity relied upon the 
affidavit of Ethel Gibbons, which was admitted over defendant's 
objection and is hearsay and totally inadmissible; and further, 
the Supreme Court has misconstrued the law and has announced a 
rule which, we feel, is totally unworkable. We feel that the 
Supreme Court has further erred in determining that prior use 
by plaintiffs or their predecessors was permissive in any event. 
If the Supreme Court shall decline to reverse its decision, we 
respectfully submit that in the administration of the interests 
of justice, a rehearing should be granted to clarify the numerous 
-12-
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problems which the decision of the Supreme Court leaves yet to 
be decided. 
DATED this day of January, 1977. 
Respectfully submitted: 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Petition and Brief 
to Richard Richards, attorney for plaintiffs and appellants, at 
his address, 2506 Madison Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, postage 
prepaid, the day of January, 1977. 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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